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The Southern Philippine island of Mindanao faces one of the longest-running violent 
conflicts in the world. Starting in the late sixties with clashes between Christian and 
Muslim armed militias, the conflict quickly obtained a more ‘national’ character as a 
full-scale war developed in the early seventies between the MNLF (Moro National 
Liberation Front), as the main representative of the minority Muslim population at 
that time, and the Philippine army. In later stages of the conflict, new rebel groups 
emerged of which the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and the ASG (Abu 
Sayyaf Group) are probably the most well-known. As a result of this post-colonial 
history of violence and confrontation, the region has also witnessed different and 
often protracted rounds of peace negotiations. Already in 1976, the GRP (Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines) and the MNLF managed to reach a peace 
agreement, the so-called Tripoli agreement. However, this agreement only became 
implemented in different stages. After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, 
Regions 9 (Zamboanga) and 12 (Cotabato) were declared as Autonomous Regions. 
Yet it was only in 1989 that the ARMM (Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao) 
was finally proclaimed, thereby including the provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao 
del Sur. Ultimately, with the final peace agreement of 1996 between the Philippine 
government and the MNLF, the city of Marawi and the island of Basilan were also 
included within the ARMM.   
At the moment, negotiations with the other major rebel group, the MILF, are still 
ongoing. Quite remarkably, although the main rebel groups in the region have been in 
a constant on and off consultation with the Philippine state for the past 38 years, 
conflict and violence are still part of everyday life for large parts of the population. 
Inevitably, this somewhat discouraging history means that some commentators have 
rather modest expectations about the current round of negotiations between the MILF 
and the GRP. Assuming that these negotiations will result in a lasting peace 
agreement in 2015 or 2016, the question still remains how far this will affect the 
everyday security concerns for large sections of the Mindanao population and how 
these national level negotiations can be complemented with alternative strategies of 
peace building and conflict management. Taking TAF (The Asia Foundation) as a 
specific case study, this paper will argue that there is an urgent need for international 
organisations to reconnect different scales of peace building and conflict management 
in light of the current peace negotiations between the government and the MILF. This 
argument is not only based on an analysis about the reach and efficiency of 
contemporary interventions of peace building and conflict management but is as much 
rooted in a specific historical analysis of the conflict in Mindanao that attempts to 
show how different scales of violence and governance dynamically interact with each 
other, ultimately resulting in a complex and multidimensional conflict ecology.  
This paper is divided into three major parts. In the first part called ‘Integration and 
Accommodation in the Post-Colonial State’, a historic overview of the conflict is 
provided. Rather than repeating the dominant historical narrative of a static and 
eternal dichotomy between the colonial and the post-colonial state on the one hand 
and the Muslim minority on the other hand, it will be shown how conflict in 
Mindanao is as much a history of integration as it is a history of confrontation. Large 
parts of the Muslim elite have always been reluctant to engage in open warfare and 
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were more interested in reinforcing their authority through an accommodation within 
the Philippine state. As a consequence, very quickly after the eruption of violence in 
the early seventies, a process of continuous consultation unfolded between the 
Philippine state and representatives of the main rebel movements in the region. As a 
result, violence between the MNLF/MILF and the Philippine state has largely been 
over the particular terms and conditions by which large sections of the Muslim 
population wish to integrate within this state and cannot be understood as a conflict 
solely in opposition to the state. In the second part of the paper called ‘Conflict and 
violence: ambiguity and heterogeneity’, this observation is then complemented with 
another scale of analysis that attempts to understand the role of violence and coercion 
in the local political economy. While the overall Muslim minority versus Philippine 
state narrative is still acknowledged as an important one, it will be illustrated how 
everyday violence in the region has some particular, heterogeneous and ambiguous 
characteristics. Building further on the insights provided in the Rido study by TAF,1 
three central observations will hereby be stressed. First of all, commanders, although 
formally representing a main rebel organisation such as the MILF or the MNLF, have 
a considerable autonomy vis-à-vis their mother organisation. This implies that these 
rebel groups cannot be approached as tightly structured organisations and the 
authority these organisations exert should be understood as a type of mediated 
authority which happens through these commanders. A second observation relates to 
the highly fluid nature of identity labels in the region. Elite constellations, necessary 
for preserving or obtaining control over the local political economy, transgress 
Christian versus Muslim, or MNLF versus MILF, dichotomies and different actors 
from different denominations become part of these alliances. It is in particular when 
these elite constellations are subject to change, as is often the case in the run-up to 
local elections, that violence tends to be prevalent. Lastly, it will be argued that in a 
region characterised by a high level of legal insecurity, the capacity for coercion 
becomes a vital asset in the build-up of political legitimacy. This is obvious in the 
field of resource management which is characterised by low levels of tenure security 
and land titling. Within this context, the capacity for coercion becomes a central tool 
to guarantee secure access to a certain property rights regime. 
In short, what part two illustrates is that violence in Mindanao has a heterogeneous 
and ambiguous character and can only be understood against the background of 
struggles over the local political economy. As a result, the authors of this paper share 
the skepticism about the potential reach of the current negotiations between the MILF 
and the GRP and the limited effects these will have on everyday security concerns for 
ordinary citizens. Yet, this observation does not imply that national-level peace 
negotiations are a useless exercise. First of all, successful negotiations between main 
rebel groups such as the MNLF/MILF on the one hand and the GRP on the other 
hand, are in themselves an imperative condition to reach (more) sustainable peace. 
Yet, as will be argued in the paper, considering the specific nature of the conflict in 
Mindanao, this type of ‘state formation from above’ can only be successful when it is 
complemented by intense, sustained and regular state-society interactions at more 
decentralised levels. Inevitably, these interactions concerning everyday governance 
issues will be highly contested and subject to different power (im)balances. For this 
paper, we have focused on the issue of resource disputes as one concrete arena where 
these interactions can be witnessed. As these resource disputes often lay at the root of 
                                                        
1
 Torres, Wilfredo Magno (ed.) (2007), Rido. Clan feuding and conflict management in Mindanao. 
Manila: The Asia Foundation.  
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much violent conflict, they constitute a fundamental part of all types of initiatives of 
conflict management. In the meantime, this process of negotiation to solve specific 
resource disputes can be understood as a specific type of state-society interaction. 
This point will be illustrated by elaborating on different initiatives to solve land 
disputes in the province of North Cotabato.2 First of all, the mechanisms through 
which potential solutions for these resource disputes are sought themselves become 
sites where state and society dynamically interact with each other. Secondly, this 
interaction is brought to a higher level in those cases where representatives, 
presumably of land titling agencies, become actively involved in the settlement of 
these disputes, either through the provision of property titles or the formal recognition 
of certain access rights. In these cases, a dynamic bottom-up process is unfolding as 
the state is increasingly being approached as the legitimate protector of one’s property 
rights. This enables a process of overcoming the strong dichotomy between strategies 
of conflict management at the so-called ‘micro-level’ of society and national-level 
peace negotiations. While these national negotiations essentially discuss the terms and 
conditions through which the Muslim population and their main representatives wish 
to integrate within the Philippine state, conflict management at the micro-level of 
society basically does the same since the conflicting parties negotiate about the terms 
and conditions for a certain settlement to their dispute, after which this settlement 
becomes formalised and presumably protected by this same state. In short, although at 
different scales, both initiatives are involved in a necessary process of negotiation 
which is mutually reinforcing and which will largely define the overall peace and 
security situation in Mindanao. 
PART 1: INTEGRATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN THE POST-
COLONIAL STATE 
 
DISPOSSESSION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
In general, conflict on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao has been 
understood as a struggle for autonomy, or separatism, on the part of a minority 
Muslim population, directed against a Christian-dominated Philippine state. The most 
prominent of the armed groups representing this Muslim minority, are the MNLF 
(Moro National Liberation Front) established in 1969 and the MILF (Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front) which broke away from the MNLF in 1977. At the time of writing, 
the MNLF and the MILF are officially no longer at war with the Philippine state. On 
the other hand, a counterinsurgency campaign is being waged against the ASG (Abu 
Sayyaf Group), a small but highly mediatised terrorist outfit that particularly came 
into the picture after the 09/11 terrorist attacks. This campaign is largely focused on 
the small island of Basilan, where the few strongholds of the ASG are situated. 
                                                        
2
 Fieldwork for this was conducted in different stages. The first part consisted of a 3 month research 
stay (February 2013 until May 2013) in Cotabato city through a grant provided by TAF. In this 
fieldwork period, research was conducted on hybrid strategies of conflict management developed by 
TAF, with a particular focus on the municipality of Midsayap, province of North Cotabato. These 
observations were then complemented with data collected during some previous research visits in and 
around the provincial capital of Kidapawan. These research visits in July-August 2011 and January-
February 2012 focused in particular on the relation between resource governance, agrarian change and 
violent conflict.  
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Furthermore, the BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters) has been established 
as a radicalised break-away faction from the MILF which does not want to proceed 
with the ongoing negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine state. This BIFF 
has in particular been carrying out attacks in the volatile borderlands between the 
provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato throughout 2012 and 2013. All this 
results in the fact that large  parts of Muslim Mindanao have gone through a situation 
of on and off warfare for over 45 years, making this one of the longest running 
conflicts in the world. The wide geographic range and long endurance of this conflict 
make it hard to provide exact data on the overall impact of the violence. A study 
conducted by the World Bank in 2005 estimates the number of people directly killed 
at 120,000; that the conflict induced a displacement of about 2 million people and had 
a direct economic cost of 2 to 3 billion US$.3 
Historically, the province of Cotabato has played a central role in the emergence of 
the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines. Before 1966, the province of Cotabato 
consisted of the current provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat 
and Maguindanao. Even today, the division of this province is understood by many 
Muslims as a deliberate attempt by Manila to break up Muslim dominance over this 
vast province, since Christians managed to gain control over the newly created 
provinces of North Cotabato (1973) and South Cotabato (1966). Moreover, after the 
inauguration of Marcos as the president of the Philippines in 1965, and more 
particularly after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1972, the Muslim elites 
historically dominating the province of Cotabato, increasingly felt isolated by the 
centralising and authoritarian tendencies of the Marcos regime. 4  This political 
sidelining was further exacerbated by a demographic transition due to the influx of 
Christian settlers fleeing densely populated regions in the Visayas and Luzon for 
Mindanao, in particular from the early 1950s onwards. As a consequence, the 
population in Mindanao overall increased rapidly. For instance, between 1946 and 
1960 the population in Mindanao grew at an astonishing 7.4 percent, double the 
national average.5 In addition, the percentage of Christians living on the island grew 
considerably. While in 1918 Muslims still accounted for 64.5 percent of the 
population in Cotabato; by 1970 this had already dwindled to 37.4 percent.6 Another 
assessment puts the percentage of Muslims on the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and 
Palawan at 76 percent in 1903, while in 1990, this had gone down to 19 percent.7 Due 
to this population growth, large swathes of uncultivated lands, considered by the 
postcolonial state as ‘public lands’, became titled private property. This process is 
closely related to a dispossession of the native community. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that this influx of Christian farmers occurred in the first place in those 
regions where the Muslim presence was weak or non-existent. A clear example is the 
whole eastern part of Mindanao where large-scale commercial agriculture was 
                                                        
3
 Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore and Judd, Mary. (2005). ‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: 
Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend’, Washington: World Bank, Social Development Papers. 
Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, no. 24. 
4
 Patricio N. Abinales (2000), Making Mindanao. Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the 
Philippine nation-state, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, p. 15. 
5
 Patricio N. Abinales (2000), op.cit, p. 97. 
6
 Guttierez, Eric and Saturnino, M. Borras, ‘The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State 
Policies’ (Washington: East-West Center 2004), p. 14. 
7
 Özerdem, A., Podder, S. and Quitoriano, E.L. (2010)’ Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: 
Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict – A Study on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
in Mindanao’, Philippines , Civil Wars, 12, p. 308. 
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developed, through the influx of Christian labour, in those regions which were (often 
sparsely) populated by IP (Indigenous People) communities.8 On the other hand, those 
places historically inhabited by Muslims, such as the western provinces of 
Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, are still politically and demographically dominated 
by Muslims today. Yet, in particular in the central province of Cotabato, demographic 
changes resulted in a socio-political transition in which an alternative Christian elite 
increasingly started threatening and outstripping local Muslim elites. Whereas the 
province of Cotabato had historically been dominated by the powerful Matalam clan, 
more specifically Udtog Matalam who was governor of the Cotabato province from 
1956 until 1967, from 1972 onwards the governorship was dominated by a Christian 
counter elite.9 These shifts in the traditional power balance left different sections of 
the Muslim population in Cotabato with a feeling of becoming second-class citizens 
in their ‘own territory’. 
Not coincidentally, Cotabato province was also the place where the first open clashes 
between Muslims and Christians were witnessed. In the first stage, a period of intense 
communal warfare erupted in the late 1960s in Cotabato province between Christian 
militias, known as Ilaga (rats) and Muslim armed militias. These clashes forced many 
Muslim communities to look for safer ground, in particular the borderlands between 
Maguindanao and North Cotabato, stretching from Pikit to Tulunan. It is from among 
these displaced Muslim communities that the bulk of the leadership of the first truly 
armed Muslim group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) originates. The 
MNLF was established in 1969.10 The basic ideology of the MNLF, laid out by its 
founder, Nur Misuari, was the establishment of an independent Bangsamoro 
homeland for the Muslims of Mindanao. These Bangsamoro are constituted from 
thirteen Islamised ethno-linguistic groups and therefore do not comprise any non-
Islamised tribes.11 Misuari proclaims independence for the Bangsamoro as a distinct 
nation based on the existence of pre-colonial Muslim Sultanates. 12  Importantly, 
Misuari’s view on Bangsamoro identity was particularly secularist, hereby 
reinventing ‘Moro identity’ as ‘a reincarnation of the pre-colonial identity as the 
descendants of the ‘unsubjugated’ and ‘uncolonised’ peoples’.13 The military capacity 
of the MNLF proved to be a profound challenge for the Philippine armed forces and 
ultimately was one of the main reasons why President Marcos declared Martial Law 
in 1972.  
 
                                                        
8
 Up to today, IPs or Lumads in the Philippines are pagans, having a historical and genealogical 
relationship to the land they are living on. As such, this category does not comprise of Muslims.  
9
 Mc Kenna 1998: 113-140, Franco 2001: Franco, J. (2001) Elections and Democratization in the 
Philippines (London: Routledge), p. 223 
10
 One should be wary of the image that a massive and spontaneous rebellion erupted under cover of 
the MNLF. Most Muslim traditional leaders openly rejected the MNLF shortly after its establishment, 
denounced the rebellion and looked for further accommodation with the Philippine state. It was only 
after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1972 that well-known Muslim traditional leaders also openly 
supported the MNLF. Thomas M. McKenna, (1998) ‘Muslim Rulers and Rebels. Everyday Politics and 
Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines’ Berkeley: University of California Press,  p138 
11
 Buendia, Rizal G. (2005), ‘The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines. Unresolved National 
Question or Question of Governance’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 13 (1), p. 115 
12
 Quitoriano, Eddie L.  (2009) ‘Land, Foreign Aid and the Rural Poor in Mindanao’, Focus on the 
Global South Research Report: p. 6. 
13
 Buendia Rizal G., op.cit, p. 115. 
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THE MUSLIM VERSUS PHILIPPINE STATE DICHOTOMY: SOME REMARKS 
Following the proclamation of Martial Law, a relatively short but intense period of 
open confrontation erupted between the MNLF and the AFP which came to an end 
with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976. While the signing of this 
agreement in no way resulted in a situation of sustainable peace, it nevertheless led to 
a considerable reduction in fighting between the two parties. Rather than a sincere 
rapprochement by the Marcos regime, this Tripoli Agreement should be understood 
in the first place as an expression of the willingness by broad sections of Muslim 
society to renegotiate the terms and conditions through which integration within the 
Philippine state could be re-established. Within classic historical overviews of the 
conflict in Muslim Mindanao, there is a tendency to paint a dichotomous narrative of 
an eternal struggle of Muslim society versus the colonial and post-colonial Philippine 
state. This narrative is flawed as it ignores the profound and deliberate penetration of 
Muslim elites in this colonial and post-colonial state. This penetration already started 
with the build-up of American colonialism that drew on a strategy of indirect rule 
through the incorporation of Muslim elites into the colonial administration. As a 
consequence, despite some violent riots in the very early phase of American 
colonialism, identification with this colonial state was remarkably high in Muslim 
Mindanao as this provided opportunities for upward social mobility in which Muslim 
elites ‘enhance their traditional status because of the power and wealth they had 
obtained through collaboration with American colonial authorities’.14 In this regard, 
the popular narrative of Muslim elites fiercely resisting the build-up of the colonial 
state project is largely false. This identification with the state continued in the post-
colonial era, as elites in Cotabato became closely involved in electoral contests, tying 
them through patrimonial linkages to centres of power in Manila and thereby 
reinforcing their authority among Mindanao Muslims. As clearly pointed out by 
Abinales in his study on state formation in Mindanao, the 1950s and 1960s were 
characterised by a remarkable stability and tranquility since the ubiquity of the 
Philippine state was hardly questioned in Muslim Mindanao.15 This stability hinged 
on a careful balance wherein strongmen maintained a great deal of autonomy but were 
simultaneously integrated within – and thereby represented – the Philippine state.  
It was this balance which became disturbed in the late 1960s due to the centralising 
tendencies of the Marcos regime and a demographic transition which inevitably 
resulted in the emergence of a Christian counter-elite. Yet, even under these 
circumstances, many Muslim elites were not particularly eager to join the MNLF. 
Some authors even go as far as saying that the majority of the established Muslim 
elites were opposed to the separatist rebellion and preferred collaborating with the 
martial law regime.16 It is therefore obvious that many Muslim elites had a rather 
pragmatic and dual position vis-à-vis the MNLF and often felt uneasy with the more 
uncompromising stance taken by younger intellectuals within the movement who did 
not belong to the traditional Muslim elites. As such, it is no coincidence that despite 
high-intensity warfare, peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines 
and the MNLF started remarkably quickly, resulting in 1976 in the Tripoli 
                                                        
14
 McKenna, op.cit, p. 101. 
15
 Abinales, op.cit, pp. 94-115. 
16
 McKenna, op.cit, p. 6. 
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Agreement.17 As a result, a majority of the MNLF core leadership quickly rejoined 
the government.  
Yet, opposition against this Tripoli Agreement caused a split within the Muslim 
armed resistance, with the establishment of the MILF in 1977 under the leadership of 
the late Hashim Salamat. 18  The MILF proved to be a serious contender to the 
hegemony of the MNLF and built up considerable grassroots support all across 
Muslim Mindanao, not least because many people lost faith in the prolonged, often 
tiresome, negotiations between the MNLF and the GRP about the specific 
implementation of the Tripoli agreement. Ultimately, these negotiations resulted in 
1996 in the establishment of the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). 
For many Muslims, this ARMM proved to be a huge disappointment, as many of the 
promises made in the original Tripoli Agreement were not fulfilled. For instance, the 
initial objective of Muslim autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities, was 
reduced in Marcos’s implementation to paper autonomy of two distinct regions.  
Under the first Aquino administration the 1986 Constitution provided for autonomy 
but the geographic coverage reduced after a 1989 plebiscite in which the majority-
Christian areas opted to stay out of the ARMM. As a result, only four provinces were 
ultimately included.19 Even after the 1996 agreement, when the act was revised, only 
one more province (Basilan, outside Isabela City) and one city (Marawi) were added.  
Moreover, even now, the ARMM is by far the poorest region in the Philippines and 
has obviously not met the expectation of sustained socio-economic progress. 20 
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the ARMM, until recently largely 
dominated by traditional politicians - and for a period (1996-2005) by top ranking 
figures within the MNLF - proved to be prone to corruption and mismanagement. As 
a consequence, support for the ARMM and those MNLF figures in charge of the 
ARMM, quickly diminished.  
All these frustrations gave a boost to the popularity of the MILF, which at different 
times became involved in open warfare with the Philippine state. On the other hand, 
preliminary talks between the MILF and the government of the Philippines already 
started as early as 1997. Once again, this indicates how the history of conflict in 
Mindanao is as much a story of rapprochement as a story of confrontation. 
Unfortunately, the outcomes of these negotiations could not meet the expectations of 
the MILF and the GRP and were therefore too often followed by a period of 
warfare.21 This was particularly the case in the years 2000, 2003 and 2008. These 
confrontations caused serious havoc and resulted in many deaths among the MILF as 
                                                        
17
 Bertrand, Jacques (2000),  ‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace 
Agreement is Fragile’, Pacific Affairs, 73, pp. 37-54. 
18
 Islam, Syed S. (1998) ‘The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of 
the Philippines’, Asian Survey 38/5 (1998), pp. 441-56. 
19
 Bertrand, op.cit., pp. 39-40; Tuminez, Astrid S.  ‘This land is our land. Moro Ancestral Domain and 
Its Implications for Peace and Development in the Philippines’, SAIS Review 27/2, pp. 80-81. 
20
 Eric Guttierez and Saturnino M. Borras, op.cit,  pp. 19-23. 
21
 The most important outcome of the 1997 talks between the Ramos administration and the MILF was 
the creation of the Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, but the ceasefire broke down irretrievably 
in 2000 with former President Estrada’s “All-Out War” against the MILF.  In 2001 with a new 
administration there came into being the CCCH (Coordinating Committees for Cessations of 
Hostilities). A body which is composed of both the AFP and the MILF and which monitors the 
situation on the ground in order to avoid further escalation of minor incidents and confrontations. After 
a 2003 eruption of violence, the International Monitoring Team (IMT) was established with the 
objective of having a neutral, foreign institution overseeing implementation of the ceasefire between 
the MILF and the GRP.  
8 
 
was the case in 2000 with the fierce assault by the AFP on the MILF stronghold, 
Camp Abu Bakr. Needless to say these encounters also led to widespread internal 
displacement,22 and had a negative effect on the overall socio-economic development 
of the region. Nevertheless, although the Philippine state and the MILF went through 
bitter episodes of armed confrontation, many people on both sides realised the 
pointlessness of these actions and acknowledged the fact that a negotiated settlement 
was ultimately inevitable. On the one hand, many people within the MILF 
increasingly indicated they had grown tired of the endless fighting and realised that 
gaining full autonomy through military victory was not a realistic option. On the other 
hand, despite the vigorous language used by some past Philippine presidents, for large 
sections of the political elite in Manila, it was equally obvious that a purely military 
solution to the conflict by defeating the MILF was impossible, considering the strong 
grassroots support for the movement. This was particularly clear after the failed MoA-
AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain) talks in October 2008 when 
the agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.23 Although this breakdown 
was met with true frustration and disappointment, talks between the MILF and the 
Philippine state resumed remarkably quickly and for the moment, the MILF and the 
GRP have once again set aside their differences and engaged themselves in a new 
round of peace negotiations. So far, these negotiations have resulted in the signing of 
the ‘Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro’ in October 2012. This Agreement is 
further completed by an annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing, an annex 
on Power Sharing and an annex on Normalisation, which handles the demobilisation 
and reintegration of MILF fighters. The next hurdle for the negotiators is the drafting 
of a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) which then needs to be ratified in the Philippine 
Congress.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this section was twofold. First, this section served as a general background 
for the reader not familiar with the history of conflict in Mindanao. Second, it 
intended to add an important nuance by showing how this history is too often 
represented through a static dichotomy between the colonial and the post-colonial 
state on the one hand and Muslim society on the other hand. First of all, all over the 
Philippines, both colonial and post-colonial statebuilding came to rest on a process of 
negotiation with local strongmen. This was no different in Muslim Mindanao as 
traditional elites came to play a central role in the build-up and the representation of 
the Philippine state. So instead of a history of eternal confrontation, statebuilding in 
Mindanao should be understood as a process of accommodation and integration, 
although a careful balance needed to be retained in which local elites could maintain 
considerable autonomy. It was this balance which became disturbed from the late 
1960s onwards due to the centralising tendencies of the Marcos regime and the 
emergence of a new, and admittedly fairly aggressive, Christian counter elite. 
Simultaneously, in particular in the province of Cotabato, many Muslim peasant 
households became displaced as Christian settlers acquired titled lands, often through 
openly violent means. These events shifted a balance in which Muslim elites, who 




 For a more detailed background on this episode, see: International Crisis Group (2008) ‘The 
Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao’ (Jakarta/Brussels Asia Briefing No. 83). 
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were well accommodated and integrated within the Philippine state, increasingly felt 
marginalised and alienated from this state. Ultimately, this led to the establishment of 
the MNLF and at a later stage the MILF. Throughout the recent history of the 
Philippines, these two groups have acted as the main representatives of the grievances 
of the Muslim population in the Philippines and have been in an on/off conflict with 
the Philippine state. Yet, large parts of the Muslim elites felt uncomfortable with a 
situation of open armed confrontation as they risked being further isolated from 
Manila. In fact, voices openly vying for separatism through violent means have 
always been marginal within Muslim Mindanao. As a result, violence between the 
MNLF/MILF and the Philippine state have largely been over the particular terms and 
conditions by which large sections of the Muslim population wish to integrate within 
this state. This also explains the openness and willingness among both the MILF and 
the MNLF to set up talks with this Philippine state. Ultimately, these negotiations 
come back to one essential point which has always been a central feature to the whole 
process of statebuilding in the Philippines, namely finding a balance between 
integration and autonomy which is deemed beneficial to both parties.   
 
PART 2: CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: AMBIGUITY AND 
HETEROGENEITY 
 
Looking at the conflict from this perspective, at first sight one can only be optimistic 
about the potential for sustainable peace in the region. Indeed, among the central 
committee of the MILF there is a sincere willingness to come to a negotiated 
settlement and talks on the FAB are already at an advanced stage. Most probably, the 
thorniest issue will once again concern the huge question of the exact border 
delineations of the ‘Bangsamoro’ (Moro nation). As could be witnessed with the 2008 
MoA-AD talks, the fear of inclusion within an institutional entity dominated by 
Muslims caused anxiety among sections of the Christian population in Mindanao 
living near the borderlands of the ARMM. This is not only the case among some 
Christian politicians but is equally the case among Christian peasants fearing to lose 
control over their lands in a context characterised by institutional insecurity and legal 
pluralism. Yet, before tackling the discussion on the implementation of the actual 
FAB, we would like to add a couple of observations about the context of violence and 
insecurity in Mindanao. Our basic argument in this section is that the Muslim versus 
Philippine state opposition as described in the preceding section has been an 
important feature of the insecurity in Mindanao over the past 45 years. However, this 
framing does not do full justice to the many complexities of the situation on the 
ground. On the other hand, painting too much of a sharp dichotomy between ‘the 
national narrative’ and the occurrence of violence and conflict at the ‘micro-level of 
society’ risks overlooking some important connections about how different 
organisations and systems of violence mutually reinforce each other.   
It has been amply demonstrated that the causes of the recurrent and persistent 
violence in Mindanao are ambiguous and cannot be solely understood as a struggle 
over the terms for integration within the Philippine state. In particular the extensive 
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study on Rido conducted by TAF has been groundbreaking in this regard.24 Based on 
a sample of 800 household surveys in Mindanao, TAF came to the conclusion that the 
majority of violent incidents in the region should be understood as feuding or revenge 
killing between families, clans and other kinship based groups, rather than as 
struggles over autonomy vis-à-vis the Philippine state. This feuding is referred to as 
‘Rido’, which in the Maguindanaon language means feud or personal grudge. 25 
Between the 1930’s and 2005, a total of 1,266 Rido cases were documented by the 
TAF research project, resulting in the death of about 5,500 people.26 It needs to be 
stressed that this is a conservative account since many of the Rido cases are not 
registered or are simply forgotten, in particular those happening decades ago. The 
provinces with the highest incidence of Rido cases include Lanao del Sur (377), 
Maguindanao (218), Lanao del Norte (164) and Sulu (145). Next, the data clearly 
demonstrate how elections and land disputes constitute the primary cause of these 
disputes.27 The most important added value about the Rido research project by TAF is 
that it provides convincing quantitative evidence on the heterogeneous nature of much 
of the fighting in Mindanao. 28  Moreover, it can clearly be derived from the 
quantitative case-studies that these feuds are not solely confined to well-known armed 
groups such as the MNLF and MILF. As will be shown below, this has far-reaching 
consequences for our general understanding of conflict in the region.  
 
REBEL MOVEMENTS, LOCAL POWERBROKERS AND MEDIATED AUTHORITY 
The MILF and MNLF cannot be solely understood as tightly structured groups in 
which a central command or other commanding body is in full control of the actual 
fighters in the field. Rather, the MNLF and MILF can only be understood in relation 
to those institutions and actors exerting control and authority over different kin-based 
social organisations. This becomes particularly clear when studying the role of those 
people generally known as ‘commanders’. In most cases, these commanders are 
incorporated within and represent a wider organisation such as the MILF or the 
MNLF. On the other hand, these commanders display varying degrees of autonomy in 
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relation to these organisations and mainly thrive on a localised support base, often - 
but not always - based on clan affiliation. As respondents in our interviews in North 
Cotabato literally indicated, ‘as a commander, you need the support of the people’.29 
As a consequence, once this support base falters, the authority you exert as a 
commander also starts crumbling. In short, as a commander in the field, it is not only 
a matter of pledging allegiance to the broader rebel movement, it is also – and 
probably foremost – a matter of building up public legitimacy in a certain locality 
which serves as the basis of your authority as a commander.   
This intimate and complex connection between public legitimacy, authority and 
allegiance to the broader rebel movement was particularly obvious when conducting 
interviews among a MNLF commander and his closest associates, operating in the 
vicinity of the provincial capital of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. As in so many other 
cases, this commander acted at the same time as the traditional leader (datu) of a well-
known clan in this region.30 First of all, discussing their relationship to the MNLF, it 
was literally stated that incorporation within the MNLF ‘gave you a voice in Manila’. 
As was pointed out, one commander can never make himself heard in Manila and 
integration within a larger association was therefore necessary to connect with the 
Philippine state. Very much in line with the argument we put forward in the previous 
section, an organisation like the MNLF can therefore not be solely understood in 
opposition to the state but can instead serve as a necessary vehicle to redefine the 
terms of incorporation within the Philippine state. This reach was important not only 
to ensure that some necessary political demands were heard throughout negotiations 
with the GRP, but was also understood as a mechanism to extract rents from the 
capital. In this particular case, the commander and his immediate entourage had 
decided to join a programme through which MNLF fighters became formally 
integrated within the AFP.31 However, at least in this particular case, they simply 
maintained their territorial control, since the AFP still had to formally ask for 
permission if they wanted to pass through the area under their control. Most 
importantly, however, this reintegration programme brought along with it certain 
benefits such as farm technology, or other livelihood support programmes for 
‘former’ MNLF fighters. As these rents were distributed through the central 
leadership to the larger population, this became a mechanism of patronage through 
which to enhance personal popularity. Moreover, this mechanism also served as an 
illustration to the community that this powerful commander was well connected with 
powerful persons outside the village through whom he could get things done. In the 
view of this commander, proving that you are well connected with the Philippine state 
through this type of rent distribution is a vital strategy in the maintenance of your 
legitimacy as a community leader. This resonates with the observation made by 
Patricio Abinales on the integration of datus in the American colonial bureaucracy, 
wherein he states that these: ‘… strong men regard their leadership as a dual one: 
enhancing an already-established place in the community by representing the state’32. 
Remarkably enough, in this particular case, linking up with a broader rebel 
organization, such as the MNLF, was considered as a vital strategy for representing 
the Philippine state to the wider community.  
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 Focus group discussion with members of the UNYPAD QRT of Barangay Tugal, Midsayap 
(Cotabato City, 12.03.2013).   
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 Considering the sensitive nature of the interview, the respondents wished to remain anonymous.  
31
 This reintegration programme was part of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement in which it was stated 
that 7500 MNLF fighters would be integrated within the AFP.  
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 Abinales, op.cit. p12 
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In short, the MNLF and this local commander stand in a complex relation of mutual 
dependence. First of all, as sketched out above, linking up with the MNLF is 
instrumental for the build-up of local legitimacy for these actors. On the other hand, 
integrating this type of commander and the people and territory over which he exerts 
control, enables the MNLF to significantly broaden their embeddedness and 
credibility among the Muslim community in Mindanao. Indeed, the area under control 
of this commander is generally known as ‘MNLF territory’. Most importantly, 
however, the authority the MNLF exerts in this territory should be understood as a 
mediated authority, which is established through a strategy of indirect rule through the 
local powerbrokers. As a consequence, some fundamental questions should be put 
forward about the strengths and boundaries of this ‘mediated authority’ and the 
degree to which central commanding institutions within the MNLF are in control over 
these local commanders.  
The observation that commanders maintain varying degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis 
their mother organisation counts as much for the MILF. For instance, as recently as 
June 2013 armed encounters took place between a group of MILF fighters and the 
57th Infantry Battalion of the AFP in the municipality of Tulunan, North Cotabato.33 
While the reasons for this encounter have to be sought in a complex web of land 
disputes and control over strategic hilltops, this happened amidst numerous and 
sincere demands by the MILF central committee to their commanders and fighters to 
refrain from attacks against the AFP in order to bring the current negotiations with the 
GRP to a good end. From this case, and from numerous interviews conducted in the 
municipality of Midsayap, it can be concluded that those commanders pledging 
allegiance to the MILF, have ‘room to manoeuver’ in their dealings in the territories 
they control and that the leadership of the central command of the MILF is not a 
direct one but should also be understood as a type of mediated authority which is 
exerted through these local powerbrokers. 34  However, considering the numerous 
internal break-ups within the MNLF, it can be presumed that the MNLF is at the 
moment a much more decentralised movement in which commanders have a great 
deal of autonomy when compared to their MILF counterparts.   
The examples given above do not intend to paint a picture of ‘loose anarchy’ in which 
local commanders act as local autocrats without taking into account the existence of 
broader political institutions. In addition, violence in Mindanao should not be framed 
through a binary distinction between political and grievance-based violence emerging 
from the historical marginalisation of the Muslim community and playing at the level 
of the MNLF, MILF and the Philippine state on the one hand, and actions at the 
micro-level of society, considered as private, anarchic or greed-based violence, on the 
other hand. Instead, it should be stressed that different scales of violence and political 
authority intimately interact with each other. As the German political scientist, Peter 
Kreuzer indicates, it is in particular the fusion of a social and political order of 
violence - which can be encountered in many places in the Philippines - ‘with a 
second form of political violence not encountered in other regions of the Philippines - 
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that of the armed struggle for independence’ 35  which determines the particular 
characteristics of violence and coercion in this region. More specifically, within this 
complex fusion we wish to illustrate that there exists a fragile mutual dependence 
between commanders in the field, often founding their legitimacy through local 
kinship based social organisations, on the one hand and the MILF and the MNLF on 
the other hand. In this context of mutual dependency, the MNLF and MILF exert a 
mediated type of authority through these commanders. On the other hand, the MNLF 
and the MILF serve as useful networks tying these commanders together in a platform 
through which they manage to reach out to Manila and the Philippine state more 
generally, once again indicating how the story of conflict and violence in Mindanao is 
probably more about connection to and integration within the state, rather than 
opposition to the state. As a consequence, both the MILF and the MNLF are no 
tightly structured hierarchical organisations but should rather be understood as 
platforms tying different authority structures together.36 As will be explained later in 
this paper, this observation has some far-reaching consequences for future strategies 
of peace building and conflict management in the region.   
 
SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND ALLEGIANCES 
‘It is a very complicated conflict; sometimes we are allies, sometimes we are 
enemies’37 
 
This observation about the relative autonomy of particular commanders within the 
MILF and the MNLF was confirmed when studying the historical genealogy of some 
specific resource disputes in the municipality of Midsayap, North Cotabato. In this 
case too, the coercive actions of commanders were predominantly determined by 
competition to obtain control over the local political economy, rather than by a 
national question about autonomy. These struggles for control over the local political 
economy were intimately linked with an involvement in electoral competition. This 
was particularly the case after 1991 when the implementation of the Local 
Government Code raised the stakes of the elections at the barangay (village) level 
through the provision of an Internal Revenue Allotment. Through the involvement in 
local elections, commanders managed to expand their authority, not in opposition to 
the state but by obtaining access to the state. In addition, in the build-up of their 
authority and legitimacy, these commanders were compelled to step into a web of 
fragile and fluid alliances. A particular example is MNLF commander Abusama who 
became barangay captain of the village of Mudseng, municipality of Midsayap, in 
1991. Yet, Abusama’s opponent in this election, Dagalas, refused to accept his 
victory. Dagalas therefore sought the support of his cousins Mama and Taro Salaton, 
both MILF commanders, to forge an alliance against Abusama. In their turn, these 
cousins called the notorious commander Tubog from the neighbouring village of 
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Tugal into their alliance. Quickly, Tubog then became the head of this anti-Abusama 
grouping. According to different respondents, the allegiance of Tubog was unclear; 
some respondents viewed Tubog either as an MNLF or MILF commander while 
others testified he was a mere criminal with no affiliation at all. Interestingly enough, 
commander Tubog and commander Abusama both started their career together during 
Martial Law as junior MNLF commanders, operating in the municipality of 
Midsayap. The conflict between the two sides started from small encounters and 
retaliations, but soon spread over the borders of Barangay Mudseng, as the conflict 
escalated into conventional warfare. As a respondent from Mudseng explained, 
‘houses were burned, there was open warfare. Lives were devastated, people fled to 
find a safe place’.38 Many inhabitants fled from Mudseng to neighbouring villages 
and by 1994 Mudseng had become a no-man’s-land.39  
This Abusama versus Tubog rivalry in Midsayap demonstrates how identity labels 
should be approached with caution in conflict-torn Mindanao, as these are 
pragmatically deployed and are therefore subject to change. In this particular case, 
two former MNLF commanders became opponents in obtaining political and 
territorial control. Moreover, both entered into strategic alliances with other 
commanders in the region. For instance, at a certain moment, Abusama was allied 
with the MNLF commanders Asrap Tayuan, and Harrison (with whom he had family 
ties) and MILF commander Samal Masgal and the latter’s family. The same goes for 
commander Tubog who was strategically aligned with various MILF commanders. 
These types of stories can be retrieved all over the region and in those places with a 
considerable Christian and IP presence, this only adds further to the complexity and 
the opaqueness of some of these temporary alliances.40  
The fluidity of these alliances points to the highly volatile political nature of this 
region in which elite constellations are constantly challenged by counter elites. As a 
consequence, these alliances are subject to change and being reshaped as actors 
constantly need to respond to changing circumstances and a whole range of actors 
make strategic assessments with whom to realign. Most importantly, however, it is 
particularly through these reconfigurations, in which existing authority networks are 
being challenged, that violence tends to become endemic. This is particularly the case 
in the run-up to the barangay and municipal elections that are often marked by 
insecurity and high levels of violence, especially when different elite coalitions of 
equal strength compete with each other. These types of closely contested elections 
have become known as ‘hot elections’ and a whole range of election initiatives have 
come into play in the last decade attempting to prevent this kind of election-related 
violence.41  
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VIOLENCE AND COERCION IN THE LOCAL POLITICAL ECONOMY  
‘Those who do not have a title, claim their land with weapons’42 
Apart from the limited control the MILF and MNLF exert over their commanders and 
the politically volatile environment in which most of these actors operate, a last and 
third important observation needs to be added to our analysis of the local conflict 
ecology in Mindanao. This observation concerns the role of coercion in everyday 
modes of governance. This argument can be illustrated by digging a little deeper into 
the Midsayap case study as described above. Interestingly enough, within the rivalry 
between commander Tubog and commander Abusama, all sorts of looming resource 
disputes became absorbed. As a consequence, this rivalry not only played out at the 
level of these commanders and close subordinates but obtained a broad social 
ramification involving large sections of society living in the territories controlled by 
both commanders. For instance, a looming dispute between two families over 16 ha. 
of land in the village of Mudseng became incorporated within a broader struggle for 
territorial control between the two commanders. The roots of this dispute have to be 
sought in a complex history of oral tenancy arrangements, internal displacement, 
informal land transactions and the contested role played by the DENR (Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources) to process legal titles for this piece of land. The 
most important lesson to be learned from this story, however, is that in a context 
characterised by a high level of tenurial insecurity and where formal dispute 
resolution mechanisms are slow, weak and distrusted, coercion and violence become 
an indispensable strategy to claim control over natural resources. In this particular 
case, this did not mean that the actual conflicting families attempted to violently 
displace one another. Instead, alliances were established with actors having the means 
of coercion in an attempt to secure or at least strengthen their claims over parts of this 
contested land. More specific, one family sought the support of commander Tubog 
while the other family became aligned with commander Abusama. By incorporating 
these types of land disputes, which are omnipresent all over the area, the rivalry 
between Tubog and Abusama went beyond the mere competition over political 
control and influence between these commanders, but obtained broad social 
ramifications thereby gravely affecting the daily livelihoods of people.43 
This story is illustrative of a broader dynamic within the local political arena wherein 
actors having access to the means of coercion come to act as local kingmakers since 
they are the ones defending a certain property rights regime in a context characterised 
by tenurial insecurity and the mere existence of unambiguous, formal property rights 
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titles. Within this process, these actors gain public acceptance and consent; in short, 
they manage to present themselves as legitimate sources of authority by having the 
coercive capacity to protect natural resources in a region which is economically still 
very much dominated by the rural sector. As a consequence, land disputes have 
become sites in which armed actors and organisations reinforce their social 
embeddedness among rural communities. This also serves as a partial explanation to 
the question of why certain commanders, seemingly little interested in providing 
public goods and services for the community, acting as autocrats in their locality and 
being accused of all types of malevolent practices ranging from vote rigging to rent 
seeking and so forth, nevertheless manage to build up a certain grassroots support and 
public legitimacy. This does not mean that the authority exerted by some of these 
actors is uncontested. On the contrary, as has been illustrated in the previous section 
on shifting alliances and allegiances, power constellations tend to be fluid and subject 
to rival claims and rival forces. Moreover, socio-political control is often enforced 
through the use of intimidation and violence, and all types of resistance against this 
socio-political control are a daily fact of life.44 Yet, it would be wrong to understand 
these fiefdoms solely as authoritarian enclaves. Socio-political control is indeed of a 
highly authoritarian nature despite the existence of a formal electoral democracy. 
Nevertheless, it was regularly stated in our research in the municipality of Midsayap 
that: ‘as a commander you need the support of the people’.45 This indicates how 
everyday modes of governance contain a certain form of reciprocity, although 
admittedly an unbalanced one. One of the arenas where this can be observed is in the 
field of resource management in which it is expected that paying allegiance to a 
certain commander will result in secure access to natural resources. This is also one of 
the main reasons why the unexpected penetration of rival factions in the territory one 
controls is considered such a grave provocation. As explained by one commander, 
these penetrations can result in a loss of prestige if they are not met with heavy 
retaliations. Interestingly enough, this retaliation mainly has an ‘internal usage’, as 
this serves as an illustration they are in full control over the territory and have the 
necessary means of coercion to protect a certain property rights regime against rival 
claimants. While the focus so far has been on commanders linked up with MILF or 
MNLF, the same observation counts for the numerous IP and Christian settler 
communities in North Cotabato where the leaders of all types of self-defence units 
dominate the local political arena. An important additional political asset for these 
leaders among Christian communities is the close and often personal connection they 
have with the police or the military who can be called on in the event of pending 
border intrusions. This illustrates how socio-political control is not solely based on 
violence as such but is as much based on having access to the means of coercion.        
These observations largely correspond with the argument that entrepreneurs in 
violence play a central role in the perpetuation of armed conflict in Mindanao. These 
entrepreneurs are defined by Gutierrez and Borras as ‘those who use their reputation 
and capacity for violence to compete for the power to make decisions affecting 
inhabitants of an area’.46  In particular, these entrepreneurs are considered to have a 
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marked capacity for violence that enables rural communities to secure control over 
property. For this reason, these entrepreneurs become enforcers of a certain set of 
property claims. Our own research on North Cotabato confirms this argument. A 
difference, however, can be noted in the characterisation by Gutierrez and Borras of 
these entrepreneurs as mere bandits or criminals, focused on the use of excessive 
violence. From talking with entrepreneurs in violence in North Cotabato, gaining a 
certain degree of social control over a certain population by becoming an enforcer of 
property claims, is much more important than the sheer use of violence. Moreover, by 
guaranteeing a (relatively) secure property rights’ regime, these actors become real 
kingmakers in rural communities since they also indirectly control the livelihoods of 
the majority of people. In this regard, land disputes are not only a source of conflict 
and violence but have become a resource - so to speak – for a certain type of actor and 
group in building up their public legitimacy and authority through coercive means.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this section we have argued that violent conflict in Mindanao should not just be 
understood as Muslim armed groups fighting over socio-political grievances against a 
Christian-dominated Philippine state. As a consequence, an analysis of the persistent 
insecurity and violence plaguing large parts in Muslim Mindanao should go beyond a 
single explanation that solely focusses on the historical marginalisation of the native 
Muslim community. Our argument is not to say this has never taken place. On the 
contrary, different studies have conclusively demonstrated how large sections of the 
Muslim society in Mindanao have been systematically dispossessed and politically 
marginalised, in particular throughout the autocratic Marcos regime. Moreover, 
throughout the whole history of violent conflict in Mindanao, the AFP has acted too 
often as a brutal occupying force and has not taken into account cultural and religious 
sensitivities.47 It is obvious that these sentiments of marginalisation and distrust are 
pervasive among the Muslim community and are an important factor in understanding 
the grassroots support organisations such as the MNLF and the MILF enjoy. The 
point nevertheless is that violence, insecurity and coercion, which have been endemic 
in this part of the world for the past 45 years, have become intimately embedded 
within the local political economy. This section attempted to put forward an 
alternative reading of the persistent insecurity characterising large parts of Mindanao 
for the last decades. Instead of understanding this insecurity through a national 
Muslim versus Philippine state dichotomy, this analysis suggests paying more 
attention to the local political economy and to the role that coercion plays within this 
local political economy. This argument builds further on previous analysis done by 
TAF which has demonstrated how the majority of the violence in the region finds its 
roots in localised disputes.48 On the other hand, while acknowledging the ‘micro-
level’ causes of much of the violence in the region, it would be a mistake to 
understand the socio-political structures behind this violence and coercion as purely 
localised and disconnected from wider governance structures. First of all, 
commanders in the field, although presenting themselves and generally being 
acknowledged as either MNLF or MILF by large sections of society, maintain varying 
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degrees of autonomy against these larger organisations. While the exact degree of 
autonomy is hard to measure and will depend on which region or which commander 
one is talking about, the point is that the actions of these actors are not solely driven 
by the strategic vision of either the MILF or the MNLF. Instead, these actions are as 
much guided by struggles for, and over, authority within the local political economy. 
Illustrative is the fact that numerous commanders have participated in local barangay 
elections in North Cotabato since the end of Martial Law. Moreover, in many cases, 
these commanders consist of datusi (traditional leaders heading a clan) that is still the 
most prominent kin-based social organisation in Muslim Mindanao. As executive, 
traditional and coercive authority are combined in one and the same person, these 
actors come to act as real ‘kingmakers’ or ‘bosses’ in their particular fiefdoms. As 
such, the authority that organisations such as the MILF and MNLF exerts, happens 
indirectly through these commanders and can therefore be understood as a type of 
mediated authority. On the other hand, and this is an important point, the integration 
of these commanders within larger structures such as the MNLF or the MILF is still 
very relevant as these are considered as tools to interact with the Philippine state. As 
such, commanders and larger rebel organisations are tied into a complex interaction of 
mutual dependence.  
Closely related to this is the observation that violent conflict in Mindanao cannot be 
understood through fixed categories and binary dichotomies. Tensions play out not 
only between Christians and Muslims - although this is an important feature of much 
of the violence, in particular in North Cotabato - but also play out equally within the 
Christian, Muslim or IP community. Once again, the end of Martial Law seemed to be 
a turning point in this regard, since different respondents in the municipality of 
Midsayap pointed out that they had experienced a transformation from what they 
considered as ‘the ideological conflict’ to ‘an inter Moro grudge or rido’ mostly 
caused by electoral competition and land disputes.49 Moreover, in the build-up of 
strategic alliances for obtaining control over the local political economy, actors tend 
to be rather pragmatic as these alliances often transgress Christian versus Muslim, or 
MNLF versus MILF, dichotomies. Overall, the existence of these fluid alliances 
points to the highly volatile nature of this region in which different power 
constellations constantly compete with each other and reshape the socio-political 
environment.  
Lastly, it has been stated that having access to the means of coercion is fundamental 
for an understanding of local authority structures in this region. First of all, this is 
linked with the observation that highly fluid elite constellations are in rivalry with 
each other and the use of violence plays a fundamental role in this competition. In this 
sense, violence is particularly characteristic in those contexts where power is highly 
challenged and contested. Illustrative in this regard is the overall fear by many civil 
society organisation not only for local elections but particularly for those elections in 
which rival elite constellations are of equal strength. At a second level, this capacity 
for coercion is also fundamental in the build-up of authority that is, at least to a 
certain degree, considered as legitimate by large parts of society. In a region 
characterised by a high level of legal insecurity, coercion plays a central role in 
everyday modes of governance. This point has been illustrated through the issue of 
resource disputes. Where legal titles over land are contested or hardly existent and 
formal dispute mechanisms weak and distrusted, the capacity for coercion becomes a 
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central tool to guarantee secure access to a certain property rights regime. In this 
regard, resource disputes and the institutional insecurity feeding these disputes, 
become resources for a certain type of socio-political authority which is highly 
coercive in nature.    
 
PART 3: IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIES OF PEACE BUILDING AND 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
The analysis of the conflict in Mindanao as presented above puts forward some 
fundamental questions about how sustainable peace can be reached in the region. As 
the insecurity in Mindanao cannot be solely understood through a persistent and 
eternal dichotomy between Muslim armed groups and the Philippine state, this 
implies that negotiations attempting to overcome this dichotomy are confined in their 
reach. Probably the most persuasive evidence underpinning this argument is the 
outcome of the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF. First of all, despite widespread 
and often pertinent criticism, it should not be forgotten that this agreement has meant 
a step forward simply by the fact that the MNLF and the GRP are no longer openly at 
war and large-scale open clashes between the two groups have in general been 
avoided.50 Nevertheless, as has been illustrated above, this ceasefire could not prevent 
a whole range of ‘minor’ clashes between the AFP and the MNLF the past years. 
Moreover, no conclusive evidence exists about the ‘trickle-down effect’ of the 1996 
agreement on the reduction of violent feuds and disputes. To our knowledge, no 
conclusive study has been carried out which convincingly demonstrates how the 1996 
agreement impacted on the overall security situation in the region. Yet, as can be 
derived from the data above, it is obvious that numerous MNLF commanders all over 
the region have maintained their coercive capacity; and that this coercive capacity is 
strategically deployed in struggles over control in the local political economy. Even in 
cases where MNLF commanders and their following entered the demobilisation 
programmess and were formally integrated into the AFP, the MNLF commanders in 
question often maintained their capacity as local kingmakers. Nevertheless, it is 
beyond doubt that this situation in which armed commanders maintain their coercive 
capacity and use it to cater for their personal interests has resulted in numerous 
violent skirmishes caused by electoral competition, disputes over land and resources 
or other issues; and has contributed to an overall climate of insecurity in large parts of 
the region which continues until today.   
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 A notable exception was the audacious attack by 200 MNLF fighters on the city of Zamboanga on 
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leadership of Nur Misuari and commander Habier Malik. Other important leaders within the MNLF 
such as Muslimin Sema have openly renounced the attacks and wish not to thwart the current 
negotiations with the MILF.  
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THE LIMITS OF A HYBRID COALITION APPROACH  
In short, while successful national-level talks are an indispensable, yet in themselves 
insufficient, component to reach sustainable peace, the effect these talks have on 
everyday dynamics of violence and insecurity seems confined. As such, these national 
negotiations need to be complemented with strategies of conflict management and 
peace building which focus on disputes rooted in violent competition over access and 
control over the political economy. We do not claim any originality with this 
argument. In fact, a whole range of initiatives are already in place in Mindanao which 
attempt to quickly solve a diversity of violent disputes, with a particular emphasis on 
avoiding an escalation of these disputes into larger warfare. Within this wide range of 
initiatives, the hybrid approach of conflict management deployed by TAF is but one 
example. As explained above, based on the data gathered in their rido study, TAF 
correctly observes that much of the violence in Mindanao has a heterogeneous 
character which is rooted in tensions over such issues as land access and electoral 
competition. This observation has resulted in a particular approach to conflict 
management which focuses on the rapid settlement of these disputes. Interestingly, 
TAF Philippines deploys a dual strategy in this regard. On the one hand, TAF is 
engaged in the current negotiations between the MILF and the GRP as a partner in the 
International Contact Group and member of the Third Party Monitoring Team 
overseeing the implementation of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and 
its annexes. On the other hand, this national-level engagement is complemented with 
a strategy of conflict management that is particularly focused on settling local 
disputes. This latter approach is known as ‘Hybrid Systems of Conflict Management’ 
and explicitly states that:  
By supporting hybrid or mixed systems that combine formal and 
informal approaches to managing conflicts, we allow the different 
systems to draw strength from one another, strengthen the conflict 
resolution process, reduce violence, and eventually draw the informal 
working systems into the ambit of mainstream formal governance 
structures. 
An elaborate analysis of the particular Theory of Change underpinning this approach 
by TAF has already been provided elsewhere.51 To sum up the main conclusions of 
this paper: this hybrid approach is mainly geared towards building broad coalitions 
which serve as platforms or lines of communication through which conflicting parties 
attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. These coalitions are conceived of as 
‘hybrids’ as they combine formal and informal actors and institutions for conflict 
settlement. By including a range of relevant mechanisms and stakeholders from both 
the formal and the informal sphere who have a certain authority and legitimacy in the 
community, these coalitions pressure the warring parties into settling the conflict. It 
also needs to be stressed that this hybrid coalition idea is guided by the observation 
that formal government institutions are weak and slow in these volatile and conflict-
affected regions. Through an analysis of Quick Response Teams as a specific 
emanation of this hybrid coalition approach, it has been illustrated how this strategy is 
particularly effective at quickly solving disputes. One of the main determinants of 
whether a particular intervention is potentially successful is the extent to which these 
coalitions reflect existing elite constellations. This requires a significant degree of 
sensitivity and understanding of local power constellations – this is where TAF’s 
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partner organisations come into play – and a great degree of flexibility and 
pragmatism in the selection of coalition members. While flexibility and pragmatism 
in working with local elites proved to be effective and efficient; this also raised 
fundamental questions regarding the legitimacy and the long-term sustainability of 
some of these settlements. It was therefore suggested that, despite the currently highly 
coercive and authoritarian nature of political authority in large parts of Mindanao, a 
more sustained engagement with formal state institutions at the local level would be 
beneficial for the long-term sustainability of these initiatives. In the remainder of this 
section we will argue that a more sustained engagement with the Philippine state, not 
only in the actual formation of hybrid coalitions of conflict management, as is already 
largely the case, but in the actual settlement of the conflict itself, could mean a step 
forward in this regard.  
 
BEYOND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: BUILDING UP LINKAGES WITH FORMAL STATE 
STRUCTURES 
A particular point of emphasis and strategic thinking concerns the ‘hybrid’ nature of 
the conflict management approach deployed by TAF. It is considered a particular 
added value that the actors and institutions involved in these coalitions are drawn 
from both the formal and informal sphere. In particular the involvement of traditional 
and/or religious leaders, and the specific type of public authority they bring along 
with them, is understood as pivotal for a successful intervention. Yet, while the hybrid 
character in terms of actors participating within these coalitions is obvious and clear, 
the second claim made in the actual ToC, i.e. that the way in which ‘informal working 
systems are drawn into the ambit of mainstream formal governance structures’ in 
actual conflict management is not clear. First of all, despite some exceptions, formal 
state structures play a limited role within these settlements. In most cases, this role is 
reduced to that of a ‘spectator’ wherein the presence of (preferably high-ranking) 
representatives of the state in peace covenant signings is understood as a sort of 
symbolic capital which benefits the sustainability of the agreement, since this puts 
pressure on the conflicting parties to stick to the agreement. Evidence supporting this 
claim is sketchy. In other cases, within the actual contract being signed by the 
opposing parties, it is explicitly stated that breaking the settlement will lead to 
retaliation by the army or the police. While this is definitely a stronger guarantee for 
compliance with the agreement, the constant rotation of army units still means that 
this is no absolute guarantee that the warring parties will not retaliate one day in the 
future.52   
These concerns about the sustainability of these settlements are intimately linked with 
questions of how far these hybrid coalitions of conflict management manage to 
address the immediate root causes of violent disputes in the region. As already 
explained, within the hybrid approach, an attempt is being made to establish a 
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coalition which serves as a vehicle to bring the conflicting parties together in a 
process of communication and mediation. When mediation is done successfully, this 
results in a solution which often, but not always, involves the payment of blood 
money to the so-called ‘offended party’, i.e. the payment of a certain amount of 
money to compensate for the violence conducted. The amount of money to be paid 
depends on the nature and gravity of the actual acts of violence. It also needs to be 
stressed that TAF itself is not directly involved in the payment of this blood money 
and this is either done by the offending party, the local mediator and/or another third 
party, in most cases local strongmen. This whole process is then concluded with the 
signing of a peace covenant in which both parties pledge they will refrain from using 
violence in the future. Although effective in putting a halt to a violent dispute, this 
practice of paying blood money only tackles the symptoms of the underlying causes 
for a conflict. This was also acknowledged by TAF staff working within the Conflict 
Management Unit who admitted their hybrid coalition approach had difficulties in 
addressing the immediate root causes of a dispute and that the majority of their 
conflict management interventions cannot be termed as real sustainable resolutions to 
a conflict, even if the conflicting parties refrain from fighting in the near future.53  
We would like to explicitly stress the word ‘immediate’ in this context as we do not 
intend to engage with general and often elusive discussions about the relationship 
between equitable and inclusive development and conflict or the potential ways in 
which poverty feeds into violence. As indicated in a recent report by TAF entitled: 
‘The Contested Corners of Asia. Subnational Conflict and International Development 
Assistance’ causalities between poverty/inequality on the one hand and 
conflict/violence on the other hand are too often taken for granted and hard evidence 
on this causality tends to be thin.54  In addition, the way certain aid programmes 
manage to prevent conflict through these development inspired interventions is often 
unclear and evidence remains patchy at best.55 However, this pertinent observation 
should not divert attention away from tackling some of the immediate root causes of 
violent disputes. In the context of North Cotabato, we specifically refer to the plethora 
of land conflicts which are rooted in a complex mixture of dispossession, 
displacement and tenure insecurity. While TAF has been involved in settling certain 
land disputes, initiatives so far that have attempted to formalise some of these 
settlement through an actual process of land titling or formal recognition of certain 
access rights are inexistent. We will argue how through some modest additional 
efforts, this hybrid coalition approach can be expanded by including representatives 
of formal land titling agencies. This will be illustrated through two initiatives in North 
Cotabato which work outside the TAF scope, but which deploy a similar hybrid 
coalition approach. The main difference, however, lies in their ability to broaden their 
coalitions by building up useful linkages with civil servants working in land 
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implementing agencies within these coalitions. These linkages are then actively 
deployed not only to reach a solution to the land dispute, but also to generate titles for 
these lands which thus gives these solutions a much more sustainable character.   
 
CASE STUDY 1: CRESCENT56  
Crescent (Center for Rural Empowerment Services in Central Mindanao) is a small 
NGO established in 2002, based in Kidapawan and vying for the peaceful solution of 
land conflicts in North Cotabato through the implementation of redistributive land 
reform. Their work is focused on eleven municipalities, spread over the provinces of 
North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat. The organisation is part of a national network 
called Katarungan, consisting of different progressive peasant movements vying for 
the redistribution of private and public lands through the CARP(ER).57  Although 
rooted in a tradition of agrarian reform, considering the particular context within 
which they operate, this NGO also attempts to tackle and solve violent land disputes, 
in particular through a strategy of redistributive land reform. While at first sight a 
very different policy compared to the ‘hybrid coalition approach of conflict 
settlement’ championed by TAF, in daily practice, there are some remarkable 
similarities. When tensions surrounding access to land or other natural resources 
emerge or have already resulted in low-intensity violence, an attempt is made to 
establish a coalition that can put pressure on both parties to stop fighting and reach a 
solution to their dispute. These coalitions consist of a mixture of politicians, 
traditional leaders, and civil servants and are very much in line with the hybrid nature 
of the coalitions as deployed by TAF.  
The majority of cases in which Crescent intervenes consist of land conflicts between 
Christians and Muslims. The root cause of these tensions goes back to the violent 
dispossession of numerous Muslim communities in the early 1970s by the Christian 
Ilaga militias. An interesting example can be observed from early 2012, when 
tensions were rapidly sharpening between a Christian community and a Muslim clan, 
named Buday, on the borderlands between the villages of New Bugasong and 
Dalapitan, in the municipality of Matalam, North Cotabato. Problems erupted when 
members of the Buday clan started planting crops on land which had been cultivated 
by the Christians for the past decades. 58  This ‘provocation’ resulted in nightly 
exchanges of fire between the two groups. Moreover, the situation was stuck in a real 
stalemate with both sides refusing to talk with each other after some failed attempts 
by the local government to bring both parties together. Guard posts for both 
communities were stationed at critical frontier zones and refined communication 
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systems immediately alerted the village centre in the case of an upcoming attack or 
the intrusion of ‘unknown elements’. Farm equipment and animals were stored in the 
centre of the village out of fear of theft. At the time of our fieldwork, some farmers 
working in the vicinity of the sensitive border zone went to their fields with armed 
bodyguards.   
The root causes for this tension have to be sought in the early 1970s when this 
particular Buday clan became displaced because of aggressive attacks by the Christian 
Illaga militias.59 This displacement offered an exceptional opportunity for sections of 
the Christian population to take over these unregistered lands. Since many Muslim 
families considered the lands they were living on as irrevocably lost after their 
displacement, the head of the Buday clan, Lakmat Buday, sold 32 ha. of his land to a 
Christian public accountant in 1976 who developed these lands into a sugar cane 
plantation on which 30 Christian households came to work as tenants. As in so many 
of the land transactions happening after the Ilaga displacement, a ‘deed of sale’, or 
selling contract, was signed between the head of the Buday clan and this accountant 
but this selling contract was never converted into an actual private property title. Due 
to the legally insecure nature of this piece of land, the son of Lakmat Buday had 
therefore seen an opportunity to reclaim the land and this is where the root of the 
dispute needs to be situated.  
This story is illustrative of a broader process happening in numerous places in North 
Cotabato where dispossessed native Muslim communities have made attempts since 
the mid 1990’s to reclaim land from which they have become dispossessed. In many 
cases, informal agreements - albeit on shaky grounds and often very contested - could 
be reached about the return of these Muslims to those lands now cultivated by 
Christians. In the meantime however, mutual suspicion remains high, not least 
because many of these informal agreements were only reached after violent incidents, 
intimidation and the use of coercion by both sides. Moreover, a context characterised 
by high levels of tenure insecurity, as can be witnessed in the case above, further 
added to an overall climate of distrust as border delineations remain unclear within 
these informal agreements and the actual legal status of occupancy for both Christians 
and Muslim remains vague. Furthermore, as explained above, the capacity for 
coercion remains a vital socio-political asset for local strongmen within this particular 
context as they can present themselves as vital protectors of land and resources.   
In those instances where violence is imminent, Crescent builds up a coalition which 
acts as a communication platform between the conflicting parties. In the case 
discussed above, this coalition consisted of one well-known traditional Muslim leader 
having family ties with the Buday clan; and a retired high-ranking Christian 
politician, symbolically representing the Christian side. These two people were 
effective in mediating and putting pressure on the conflicting parties to refrain from 
using violence. However, this could only be realised after promises were made that a 
sustainable and equitable settlement for the land conflict would be reached. As a 
result, linkages were established with key people in different land registration 
agencies such as the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) 
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and the DAR (Department of Agrarian Reform). Through an informal coordination 
with these agencies, possibilities were outlined through which a negotiated settlement 
could be established between the competing claims. As outlined above, the contested 
piece of land was still state-owned public land, although a deed of sale existed. The 
problem, however, was that the Buday clan could not claim land based on their 
occupant status. For this reason, options were discussed to see whether the deed of 
sale could be declared illegal as the signatory by Lakmat Buday was apparently 
forged.60 However, in other cases where the returned Muslim community had already 
been living for many years, successful attempts have often been made to bring these 
contested lands under land reform through the CARP law. This was done after close 
deliberation with both communities and had the main advantage that ultimately, both 
communities received secure property titles for their particular piece of land. Before 
discussing this approach in more detail in relation to the hybrid coalition approach 
deployed by TAF, we would like to include another case study situated in the 
province of North Cotabato.   
 
CASE STUDY 2: NATULARAN MU61  
A second case concerns an alliance of different barangays (Nabalawag, Tugal, Lower 
Glad, Rangeban, Nes and Mudseng) all situated in the municipality of Midsayap, 
North Cotabato on the volatile borderlands between North Cotabato and 
Maguindanao. This ‘peace alliance’ as they wish to portray themselves was 
established in 2005 through funding by the Integral Development Services, 
Philippines (IDS Phil) and the German Technical Cooperation. The trigger for the 
establishment of the alliance was the violent displacement of numerous inhabitants of 
Nabalawag, Mudseng, Rangebang and Tugal to the villages of Lower Glad and NES 
after tensions - mostly revolving around land and resources - between Christians and 
Muslims and between different groupings within the Muslim community, started 
running out of control. Although the funding by the IDS Phil and the German 
Technical Cooperation ended after 2007, Natularan Mu maintained their focus on 
peace building activities and conflict management. Part of the strength of Natularan 
Mu lies in its strong political connections. Since 2006 the alliance has been headed by 
Vicente Rabara, barangay captain of the village of Lower Glad and brother of the 
mayor of the municipality of Midsayap, Manuel M. Rabara. These overt political 
connections clearly set some limits to the reach of the activities of Natularan Mu. On 
the other hand, these same connections also add a political weight that enables the 
organisation to reach certain dispute settlements. It is also important to know that 
there is an indirect consultation with the MILF within this alliance through the 
OPAPP (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process) and the Municipal 
Local Government Unit. Unfortunately, however, some commanders with very 
doubtful credentials were also included in this alliance, which was an obvious and 
logical reason why TAF did not wish to work with them. Nevertheless, despite these 
major flaws, some of the initiatives undertaken by Natularan Mu are worth taking into 
account.    
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Although involved in a whole range of disputes, the core agenda of the alliance is the 
peaceful settlement of land conflicts in the region. Broadly speaking, the root causes 
of these land conflicts are similar to those described for the Matalam case study, i.e. a 
history of violent displacement of the native population and an influx of Christian 
farmers within a context characterised by tenure insecurity, legal pluralism and very 
low levels of formal land registration. In particular, throughout the early 1970s, 
numerous native Muslim households became displaced because of violent attacks by 
the Christian Ilaga militias. Most often, these ‘empty’ lands were then cultivated by 
Christian settler peasants. In contrast to the municipalities around Kidapawan, violent 
clashes between Christians and Muslims have continued largely unabated since then. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, various violent attacks were conducted by a 
Christian armed militia called Bantai Bayan that was involved in open confrontations 
with the MILF, thereby displacing numerous native Muslim households. All this 
further added to a context of communal distrust and resentment and has proven to be a 
fertile breeding ground for Muslim and Christian armed commanders and groupings 
alike. In some cases, this history also resulted in intra-religious tensions over land 
access and control as was the case between the Muslim Namil and Sugol families. 
Throughout the 1950s members of the Namil family came to work as tenants on land 
that historically belonged to the Sugol family. However, in the early 1970s the Namil 
family sold their land to Christians, out of fear of pending attacks by the Ilaga 
militias, after which the Sugol family bought this same land back from the Christians 
and so the land stayed in the hands of the Sugol family. During the 1980s, however, 
the Namil family managed to obtain a private property title with the DENR for this 
particular piece of land, apparently on dubious, or at least contested, grounds. In the 
meantime, a close relative of the Namil family had become a commander in the MILF 
which strengthened their claims over the land. Since then, these two families have 
been in conflict with sporadic outburst of violence and retaliation.   
Natularan Mu intervenes in this sensitive context by initiating a dialogue between the 
conflicting parties. Within this dialogue, a broad range of stakeholders are invited, 
ranging from local politicians, MILF and/or MNLF representatives, civil servants etc. 
What is unique in their approach, however, is the proactive involvement of DENR 
personnel as the main agency responsible for titling unregistered public lands within 
this coalition. Interestingly enough, some remarkably efficient, yet highly unutilised 
mechanisms exist within municipal and provincial DENR offices to settle land 
disputes. 62  The most prominent example is the ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
(ADR) mechanism through which two contending parties can reach an amicable 
settlement for a certain land conflict under the supervision of the DENR. Within this 
ADR mechanism, the DENR only treats those cases which are formally brought to the 
DENR. Although there is no fixed rule, compensation money is often paid to reach an 
agreement. Yet, the most important added value of working through this ADR is that 
property titles can be easily released by the same DENR office. Importantly, this 
amicable settlement mechanism can only be used in those cases where no appropriate 
titles for land have yet been generated, and where the land is therefore considered as 
public land.63  Yet, considering the low level of land titling in some of the rural 
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hinterlands in North Cotabato and other places in Mindanao, this poses no immediate 
problem.  
While working through the DENR definitely has an important added value to reach 
sustainable solutions to looming land and resource disputes, this is no guarantee for 
success either. For instance, within the Natularan Mu, despite the connections with 
some DENR personnel, no settlement could be reached for the aforementioned Namil 
versus Sugol tensions for the simple fact that the mediation between these two 
conflicting parties was unsuccessful. As a consequence, while the two families are not 
particularly on speaking terms, real outburst of violence have been  prevented through 
the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Team (JCMT) consisting of MILF 
and AFP representatives that was stationed between the villages of Rangeban and 
Mudseng. While in this case the negotiations organised by Natalarum Mu and the 
direct involvement by the DENR did not result in a sustainable solution to the 
conflict, other success stories have been noted. For instance, this was the case with 
tensions between two families over a piece of land of 24ha. in the village of Mudseng. 
Not only was the dispute between these two parties settled with the assistance of the 
OPAPP through a division of the land that was considered fair and equitable by both 
contending parties, but this division was also formalised since the DENR provided 
legal titles to both parties.  
 
STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: RETHINKING SCALES AND INTERACTIONS 
The conflict management strategy deployed by TAF, departs very much from an 
analysis of the conflict in Mindanao which is rooted in a national versus local 
dichotomy. While it is acknowledged that feuds or rido have a potential to escalate 
into larger warfare, the root causes underlying these feuds are largely considered to be 
disconnected from the national struggles around autonomy. As explained above, this 
dichotomy between national issues and specific tensions at the micro-level of society 
has enabled us to move away from a top-down analysis of the conflict in Mindanao 
and opened our eyes to the heterogeneous character of much of the violence in the 
region. However, things become more problematic when these national and micro-
level viewpoints are approached as two scales which are disconnected from each 
other. As noted by the influential Yale-based scholar Stathis Kalyvas in an article on 
identity and action in civil war, violent conflicts cannot be explained through one 
overarching issue or ‘master cleavage’.64 In this particular case, this master cleavage 
would be the ‘eternal’ contradiction between the Christian-dominated Philippine state 
and its Muslim minority. Instead, Kalyvas suggests that actions in civil war are often 
informed by local issues and struggles. Yet, despite this argument on the localised 
nature of much of the violence in civil war, Kalyvas also states how armed groups in 
the centre of the conflict and those at the periphery make ‘for the joint production of 
action’.65 Through this interaction, local tensions and enmities are incorporated into 
the general master narrative of the conflict. This is an important observation since 
these linkages and interactions will to a large extent determine the particular 
escalation and genealogy of a violent conflict. In short, this observation warns us not 
to draw too sharp a distinction between micro-level dynamics of violence, as 
exemplified by the term rido, on the one hand and the questions, tensions and 
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contradictions playing at the national level on the other hand. In this paper, we have 
also illustrated how a particular type of coercive authority, which in general lies at the 
root of many of these feuds, is embedded within a complex and multilayered conflict 
ecology. In other words, although the actions of certain commanders are often driven 
by competition over the local political economy, these commanders are still integrated 
within regional rebel structures which are also vital to the build-up of their authority 
at the local level. As such, different systems and scales of violence and coercive 
authority should be analysed in relation to each other and cannot be treated as 
separate spheres.  
This framing of the conflict in Mindanao as a dichotomy between national and 
localised issues is reflected in an approach to conflict management and peace building 
which departs from this same dichotomy. On the one hand, there is a range of 
initiatives which explicitly focus on quick dispute settlement and conflict 
management at the micro-level of society through local NGOs which have a strong 
local embeddedness. On the other hand, there are the national-level negotiations 
between the MNLF/MILF and the GRP in which TAF, at this particular moment, is 
also involved as a partner through the International Contact Group and the Third Party 
Monitoring Team. Yet, as different scales of violence and coercion are inextricably 
linked, more efforts could be made to rethink how different scales of conflict 
management and peace building initiatives also relate to each other. This is without 
doubt a challenging intellectual exercise. A first step in this exercise could be taken 
by reconsidering how access to the state is being conceptualised within these different 
scales. People will have little doubt that the current negotiations between the MILF 
and the GRP essentially revolve around an agreement about the specific modalities 
through which the Muslim minority and their main representatives wish to integrate 
within the Philippine state. A characteristic discussion in this regard concerns issues 
of taxation and natural resource extraction within the future Bangsamoro. Although 
this may seem strange at first sight, strategies of conflict management at the 
community level are, ideally, not that different. As illustrated with the two examples 
above, conflict management is not only about the actual settlement of a certain land 
dispute but is just as much about a fundamental discussion of the modalities through 
which certain conflicting families, or other kinship based groups, or certain local 
powerbrokers for that matter, wish to call on the authority of the state as a legitimate 
protector of their (property) rights. In other words, as rightly indicated by TAF staff, 
proper conflict management is ‘governance in action’.66 Considering the fact that the 
Philippine state remains a relevant actor in these conflict-affected regions, this 
governance in action by definition preferably interacts with those institutions 
representing the Philippine state, not only in the actual constitution of the coalitions 
negotiating a settlement, but also in the settlement itself. For instance, this was the 
case with Crescent and with Natuluran Mu. This is not to say that the two initiatives 
described above are textbook examples of successful conflict management. In the 
case of Crescent, when solely relying on the CARP programme for dispute settlement 
and land titling purposes, one is inevitably confronted with some important 
limitations, not least the fact that this programme is expected to end by 2014. 
Moreover, it was clear from our interviews that the Natularan Mu alliance was totally 
captured by a specific and rather problematic elite constellation, which hindered the 
development of this network as a trustworthy and truly inclusive peace alliance. 
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how these initiatives are not afraid of a direct and 
open engagement with the Philippine state, and this brings some important 
advantages. First of all, as already indicated, this engagement gave a more sustainable 
character to the solutions reached. For instance, the facilitation by Crescent between a 
group of Christian settlers and the (returning) native Muslim population in the village 
of Kibya, municipality of Matalam, resulted in the provision of individual property 
rights titles after a careful and long deliberation between the two opposing parties.67 
Moreover, since this agreement was reached, communal relations between the two 
groups have been remarkably stable and the settlement of this land conflict can 
therefore be considered as sustainable. This is inevitably linked with an important 
observation made earlier in this paper, i.e. how a context characterised by high levels 
of tenure insecurity inevitably feeds into the development of a specific type of 
coercive authority.  
Another point that needs to be stressed in this regard is the issue of building trust 
through daily social interactions. Based on different participatory observations, it 
became evident that a process in which land titling agencies proactively helped in 
mediating between conflicting parties inevitably resulted in a rapprochement between 
state and society. This was also the case among those groups where suspicion against 
the Philippine state has been traditionally high. Nowhere is this more obvious than in 
the recent rapprochement between the AFP and the hybrid coalitions of conflict 
management, established under the guidance of TAF. This rapprochement was made 
possible through the presentation in 2011 of the AFP’s new ‘Internal Peace and 
Security Plan’.68 Within this document, an analysis is made that in order to reach a 
sustainable peace one should go beyond a purely military approach, i.e. battling 
armed insurgent groups. Therefore, an alternative collective approach (the so-called 
‘whole of nation approach’), in which different sectors in society have a stake, is 
suggested as a way of reaching peace and security. For obvious reasons, this new 
security plan is part of a broader strategy by the Aquino administration to reach peace 
in Mindanao and this is focused overall more on negotiation than confrontation. 
While this may seem somewhat vague, one of the most concrete outcomes of this new 
approach so far is that sections within the military in conflict-affected places in 
Mindanao are doing their best to reach out and build up links with civil society 
organisations vying for peace. As such, this new doctrine opened up a window of 
opportunity for TAF and its partner organisations to engage more directly with the 
military and therefore became part of the DFID funding under PPA 5. This also led to 
the formulation of a specific ToC on ‘Community-led Efforts to Improve Local 
Security’. Within this ToC it is claimed that:  
By supporting community-led efforts to improve relations with security 
forces, violent incidents will be less common and less severe. Improved 
relations between conflict-affected communities and security forces 
(and within communities themselves) will reduce the risk of tensions 
and incidents that result from poor communication. 
Although still at a preliminary stage, this rapprochement between the military and 
TAF partner organisations has significantly benefited the effectiveness of conflict 
programming by TAF. Although this is no absolute guarantee, due to the constant 
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geographical rotation of military units, the involvement of security personnel in the 
settlement of disputes adds to the sustainability of these settlements. Moreover, this 
rapprochement results in an important exchange of information in which these hybrid 
coalitions often act as lines of communication between the AFP on the one hand and 
armed insurgent groups such as the MNLF and the MILF on the other hand. These 
lines of communication are particularly vital in case of tensions. For instance, it was 
interesting to see how after the Zamboanga attack on September 8th 2013, military 
personnel and MNLF commanders all over North Cotabato province immediate 
started calling, assuring each other that no attacks were being planned. This 
immediately reduced some tensions, uncertainties and agitations, not only among the 
MNLF and the AFP but also among the broader population. Last but not least, these 
informal interactions between military and armed groups, often facilitated through 
coalitions such as the ones established by TAF, inevitably increases mutual respect, 
although this point remains hard to prove through real quantitative evidence.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this section, we have illustrated how our particular analysis of the violent conflict 
in Mindanao demands a proactive working relationship with the Philippine state in 
strategies of peace building and conflict management. Considering the central role 
played by violence and coercion in the local political economy and the fact this 
violence is not solely driven by a demand for autonomy, it has been stated that the 
ongoing national level talks between the MILF and the GRP, are an indispensable, yet 
in itself insufficient, strategy to reach sustainable peace in the region. As the violence 
in Mindanao has a particular heterogeneous character, these negotiations have a 
limited reach and need to be complemented with other conflict management 
strategies. It is here that the hybrid coalition approach by TAF comes into play as this 
approach explicitly aims to tackle these diverse violent feuds. This hybrid approach 
has some particular advantages due to its capacity for quickly developing coalitions 
which act as communication channels between the warring parties. These coalitions 
are conceived of as ‘hybrids’, as they purportedly combine formal and informal actors 
and mechanisms. Yet, despite these notable advantages, some deficiencies can be 
noted. A first point of critique was the observation that the immediate root causes of 
violent disputes are not tackled, a point duly acknowledged by TAF staff themselves. 
A second point of critique is that this hybrid approach is somewhat narrowly focused 
on the ‘micro-level’ of society, at a scale that is largely disconnected from the master 
narrative of the conflict. Instead, it has been illustrated how different scales and 
systems of violence and coercion are intimately linked to each other in Mindanao. As 
a consequence, more attention should be focused on the question of how different 
systems and scales of conflict management relate to, and mutually influence, each 
other.  
As a preliminary answer to these questions, a suggestion has been made for a more 
active involvement of the Philippine state with ongoing programmes of conflict 
management. This implies that the hybrid approach of conflict management as it 
stands now should not be abandoned. Instead, it is suggested that, with some minor 
efforts, this approach can be expanded. This point has been illustrated by referring to 
two other NGOs which work outside of the scope of TAF, yet depart from a similar 
hybrid coalition approach. These two NGOs attempt to tackle the numerous resource 
disputes playing all over the province of North Cotabato. As has been illustrated, 
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these resource disputes should be situated within a context characterised by the 
complex interplay between tenure insecurity, the violent dispossession of the native 
population and low levels of formal land titling. In an attempt to settle violent 
disputes over land and resources, representatives of land titling agencies are not only 
part of the actual coalition mediating between the conflict parties, in collaboration 
with these representatives, attempts are being made to formalise the solution reached 
by awarding titles to these lands. In short, despite limited funding, these initiatives 
search for solutions to land conflict which are sustainable and go beyond mere 
attempts to prevent the conflicting parties from fighting again. Moreover, considering 
that a situation of tenurial insecurity feeds into the development of a certain type of 
strongman defending property in this highly volatile environment, the breeding 
ground for this coercive authority is gradually being taken away. Secondly, a closer 
involvement with the state will overcome too strong a dichotomy between strategies 
of conflict management at the so-called ‘micro-level’ of society and the ongoing 
negotiations between the MILF and the GRP.  While these national negotiations 
essentially discuss the terms and conditions through which the Muslim population and 
their main representatives wish to integrate within the Philippine state; conflict 
management at the micro-level of society basically does the same, since conflicting 
parties negotiate about the terms and conditions for a certain settlement to their 
dispute, after which this settlement becomes formalised and presumably protected by 
this same state.  
 
CONCLUSION: PEACE MAKING AND STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 
It is expected that the current, ongoing peace talks between the MILF and the GRP 
will in the near future (presumably in 2015 or 2016) result in the creation of an 
autonomous Bangsamoro entity, having control over a diversity of competences, 
ranging from policing to natural resource extraction. Yet, despite the positive 
atmosphere within which the current talks are being held, skepticism still persists as 
to whether this Bangsamoro will be able to live up to its promise of delivering 
sustainable peace. One of the recurring discussions in this regard concerns the specific 
modalities for the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former 
MILF (and presumably also MNLF) fighters.69 Although the annex on normalisation 
has been signed as recently as January 2014, in general, it is expected this will be a 
difficult and gradual exercise.70  More importantly, this DDR discussion points to a 
much more fundamental issue which concerns the particular ways in which the 
capacity for violence and coercion will still remain vital assets in the local political 
economy, despite a successful conclusion of the talks between the MILF and the 
GRP. So long as this issue is not properly addressed, DDR initiatives risk becoming 
useless exercises since the incentives to effectively turn in weapons are particularly 
low, as was the case after the 1996 peace agreements. In other words, the real 
question does not concern the technical details about the actual DDR processes and 
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how these will be negotiated between the MILF and the GRP, rather the real 
challenge concerns the vital role played by violence and coercion in the build-up of 
political authority in this part of the world.  
Importantly, this observation not only points to the limits of national-level 
negotiations, this also brings to the fore some concerns about the reach of a hybrid 
strategy of conflict management as deployed by TAF. Put simply, while this strategy 
is indeed useful for a quick settlement of disputes in order to prevent a further 
escalation of violence, this strategy does little to address the central role played by 
coercion in the local political economy. We have attempted to demonstrate how a 
hybrid coalition approach of conflict management can tackle this issue through a 
more engaged working relationship with the Philippine state to address the immediate 
root causes of violent disputes.71 We have illustrated how this can be achieved by 
referring to two NGOs working in North Cotabato outside the scope of TAF. These 
NGOs depart from a similar coalition approach in their attempts to tackle violent land 
disputes in the region. The main difference, however, lies in the fact that additional 
efforts are being made to formalise the actual settlement reached. In these cases, this 
was done through a process of land titling in coordination with representatives of land 
implementing agencies. We do not mean to say that solving the issue of land is the 
ultimate key for the establishment of more sustainable peace in Mindanao. Although 
land disputes certainly constitute a major source of violent incidents in North 
Cotabato and are also pivotal in the build-up of coercive authority, these land disputes 
can only be understood in relation to other issues such as electoral competition or 
patronage politics. Moreover, we do not imply that partner organisations working 
within the TAF scope, should attempt to copy these two NGOs. In fact, they should 
not. Instead, what these examples intend to illustrate is that there is a range of 
institutional mechanisms and actors among certain state agencies which can be 
incorporated within ongoing strategies of conflict management. In these examples, 
this engagement was founded on working relationships - often through informal 
contacts and interactions - with representatives within the DENR or the DAR. These 
representatives were included in the ongoing negotiation between conflicting parties 
when there was contestation over a certain piece of land and they became part of the 
actual solution since they formalised the agreement reached by providing ownership 
titles to both parties, thereby enhancing the sustainability of these settlements. In 
short, what is happening here is a true and sustained state-society interaction at the 
local level, wherein the role of state officials is not confined to one of an audience in 
strategies of conflict management. Instead, state authority is proactively employed to 
reach a more sustainable security situation, albeit in a confined geographical location. 
Once again, these interactions are messy, non-linear processes happening in everyday 
socio-political encounters and contestations over authority, space, resources etc. In 
our opinion, the manner in which these contestations are resolved peacefully, 
presumably with the help of some NGOs or other civil society organisations, and the 
capacity and willingness of the state to formalise and protect these fragile settlements 
will largely determine the peace and security situation in Mindanao in the future.  One 
of main reasons for this is exactly the way institutional insecurity, such as in the field 
                                                        
71
 This is not only the case for those regions being part of the current ARMM and which will become 
included in the future Bangsamoro. This is inasmuch relevant for those regions where violence and 
coercion still are vital assets in the build-up of authority in the local political economy, but which are 
not included in the current ARMM, as is the case in the areas researched in North Cotabato.  
33 
 
of resource management, has been deployed as a strategic resource in the build-up of 
coercive authority.  
As could be derived from different interviews and observations, the coalitions 
deployed by TAF in their conflict management strategy are dynamic partnerships; 
open to critique and adaptation. Starting as local partners in a research project on rido, 
with some minor funding, some of these partners became deployed within a hybrid 
coalition strategy of conflict management. So far, these coalitions have been mainly 
focused on the reduction of violence. Nevertheless, as already discussed elsewhere, 
the way ‘informal working systems are drawn into the ambit of mainstream formal 
governance structures’, as is being claimed in the ToC on conflict management, has 
so far been less elaborated upon. Taking up this challenge would only be a logical 
next step and can be reached through a more proactive working relationship with the 
Philippine state, or at least those representatives and government agencies that share 
the same goal of a more peaceful society. Interestingly enough, among these partner 
organisations working with TAF, there is an explicit demand for a closer working 
collaboration with the state. In other words, these institutions wish to position 
themselves at the interface between state and society. 
For instance, members of one TAF partner organisation, called Magungaya, explicitly 
see for themselves a future task in building up a closer relationship between Muslims 
and the Philippine state, thereby enhancing the capacity of the Philippine state in 
those conflict-affected places where they are working. Remarkably, this partner also 
states that a successful conclusion of the current peace negotiations will enable them 
to take this next step, thereby transgressing the mere settlement of violent disputes as 
they are doing now.72 While these partner organisations, or the coalitions they have 
established, do not have the ambition of becoming usurped as formal institutions by 
the Philippine state (and this is also not deemed particularly feasible) they definitely 
have the ambition of engaging in a closer relationship with the Philippine state in a 
broader project on state-society interactions at a decentralised level. In fact, the 
evolution of the hybrid coalition approach by TAF already goes a long way in this 
direction, with the recent closer working relationship with state security forces. As 
illustrated, this working relationship not only benefits the sustainability of some of the 
settlements reached but also avoids miscommunication between the AFP and rebel 
organisations and decreases the distrust of the AFP among large sections of the native 
Muslim population in Mindanao. Hopefully, these benefits will serve as an inspiration 
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